The privatisation of public enterprises in France and Great Britain : the state, constitutions and public policy by PROSSER, Tony
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
DEPARTMENT OF LAW
E U I  W O R K I N G  P A P E R  N o .8  8 / 3  6 4
TH E PRIV A T ISA T IO N  OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 
IN FRANCE AND G REA T BRITAIN 
The State, Constitutions and Public Policy 
by
TONY PROSSER






























































































All rights reserved, 
o part o f this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission o f the author.
©  Tony Prosser
Printed in Italy in Novemberl988 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
CONTENTS
Introduction..................................................................................................1
The State and Constitutions....................................................................2
Nationalisation and Unresolved Problems........................................... 10
The Privatisation Programme: Background and Origins....................... 19
Implementing Privatisation in France..................................................22
The Scope and Form of the Privatisation Legislation......................24
Parliamentary Scrutiny............................................................................28



























































































































































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
INTRODUCTION
This paper will be concerned with the effects of differing conceptions of the 
role of the state and differing constitutional arrangements on the delivery of 
public policy as revealed through a comparison of the programmes for the 
privatisation of public enterprises in Britain and France. Both countries have 
adopted extensive privatisation with the ascent to power of Governments of the 
Right; in fact, the earlier British privatisation programme has offered a major 
source of inspiration for France. However, there have been major differences in 
the nature of the enterprises to be sold and on the mechanisms for sale in each 
country, and one aim of this paper will be to establish the extent to which 
these can be attributed to constitutional divergencies.
Recent work within comparative political economy has stressed the importance of 
political differences, and in particular differences in the role of the state, in 
the formation and implementation of economic policy Csee, in particular, Hall, 
1986]. Relatively little  work has, however, been undertaken on the role of
constitutional arrangements in this context. Such arrangements are closely 
connected with the conception of the state predominant in each country, but the 
effects on policy making may be paradoxical. In particular, of central
importance is the variation between the 'stateless' society of Britain, in which 
economic policy formation has been traditionally conceived as largely the 
responsibility of private actors, and the 'state' society of France in which the 
state itse lf has traditionally adopted a major role. However, I will defend the 
hypothesis that the sort of constitutional arrangements associated with a 
'state' society may impose greater restraints on policy-making than those of
'stateless' society; in other words, that a strong state may gain its strength




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
constitutional law. This will be analysed in two ways; the first being an 
examination of the constitutional constraints on the freedom of manoeuvre of 
government in implementing privatisation. Secondly, I will examine the relations 
between government and privatised industries to assess the degree to which the 
role of the state has been replaced by impersonal markets or whether important 
tools of state intervention have been retained. This will enable me to assess 
whether economic liberalism provides an adequate substitute for constitutional 
controls on government.
One point needs stressing here; this is a working paper and represents the 
presentation of a set of hypotheses rather than a fully developed work: I hope 
that it will act as a catalyst for criticism and future recasting of the ideas 
set out. For reasons of space it has proved necessary to exclude important 
themes. Firstly, discussion here will concentrate on France, with only brief 
references to Britain for comparative purposes. Similar themes have in fact 
been discussed elsewhere in relation to Britain in considerable detail by myself 
and a colleague [Graham and Prosser, 1987]. Secondly, I will omit discussion of 
regulation of enterprises after privatisation. This has assumed considerable 
importance in Britain and in France (in the latter country in the area of 
broadcasting), but must await future treatment.
THE STATE AND CONSTITUTIONS
It is now something of a truism that in Britain the concept of the state is 
alien to constitutional analys'is [see generally on concepts of the state Dyson, 
19801. Indeed, the difficulty with which English judges handle the concept has 
been recently illustrated in litigation concerning privatisation, where the 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
belonged to the state served not to clarify ownership but to sow general 
confusion as to what the concept of the state might refer [Ross v Lord Advocate 
[1986] 3 All ER 79]. Of course, this denial of the centrality of the concept of 
the state in Britain is not to deny that Britain has an extended and powerful 
state apparatus. Rather it is to suggest that concept of the state as the 
means for 'the rationalist pursuit of order (in its broadest sense) in a society 
subject to ceaseless change' [Dyson, 1980: 7] has been absent from the British 
political and legal tradition. '\^There has also been no attempt to systematise 
relations between the individual and the state; and, in particular, English law 
has not evolved 'the idea of the state as a formally recognised legal
institution, subject to its own distinct norms and procedures and integrating 
diverse institutions' [Dyson, 1980: 41, and see generally 36-44, 112-6, 199-201, 
210-2]. The following quotation from President Pompidou (addressing his ex­
colleagues in the Conseil d'Etat in 1970) would be inconceivable in Britain:
For more than a thousand years... there has been a France 
only because there was the State, a State to bring it 
together, to organize it, to make it grow, to defend it not 
only against external threats, but also against group 
egotisms and rivalries. Today, more than ever, the State's 
force is indispensable not only to assure the nation's 
future and its security, but also to assure the individual 
his liberty, [quoted in Dyson, 1980: 84].
Paradoxically, however, a developed concept of the state can also lead to 
important constraints on government. The paradox lies in the fact that a 
state tradition is associated with ideas of a strong state; it is 'accompanied by 
a widespread sense 1 of the legitimacy of public action (action that is 
independent of party ideology) and by a willingness to define 'public power' as 
distinctive and to exercise it authoritatively.' [Dyson, 1980: 256]. However, a 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
lacking in Britain: there has been no development in England of a separate 
system of administrative courts or a coherent and distinct system of legal 
principles governing state action. By contrast, in France the Conseil d'Etat has 
over many years developed distinctive principles of review of administrative
1
action, and many of these have been borrowed by the Conseil Constitutionnel in 
its role of reviewing legislative proposals. Bearing in mind that 'Government' 
and 'state' are not synonymous in societies with a developed state tradition, 
one finds that the application of constitutional and administrative law
principles may impose real constraints on government. A further paradox is 
that, whilst the constitutional arrangements of the Fifth Republic impose major 
limits on the legislative powers of the French Parliament and increase those of 
the Executive, the interventions of the Conseil Constitutionnel at the initiative
!
of members of the Assembly and Senate may, as we shall see, provide potentially
more effective constraints on the governmental legislative proposals than
" Nanything available to MPs during the British privatisation process.
It is certainly clear that the differences in conceptions of the state and in 
its organisational forms in Britain and France have had a crucially important 
influence on the political economies of the two countries, in particular in 
providing an interventionist state with a much more central role in leading 
economic growth in France [see Hall, 1986; Hayward, 1986, and Shonfield 1965; 
esp. ch V3. It is now clear that these differences have also had an important 
role in the implementation of the privatisation programme in the two countries. 
In Britain constitutional analysis in relation to privatisation has been 
remarkable by its absence; only two cases of minor importance have reached the 
courts and virtually no academic ink has been spilled on the subject [but cf 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
lack of a developed state tradition has had important effects. Thus the British 
conception of the state as a vaguely threatening monolith has served to give 
added ideological legitimacy to the privatisation programme; a central theme of 
the justifications produced by the Thatcher Governments has been that 
privatisation frees enterprises from the dead hand of the state, and encourages 
responsibility and independence by enforcing the self-reliance of commercialism 
and the market.
t
In France, by contrast, the rhetoric of privatisation included fewer anti-state 
references, and indeed it has been suggested that the process represents a 
potential strengthening of the state by concentrating its forces on its natural 
missions; to quote the Minister for the Economy, for Finance and for 
Privatisation;
Le dynamisme de notre société suppose un Etat fort, sûr de 
ses missions. Il est incompatible avec un Etat 
tentaculaire se substituant aux acteurs économiques. La 
privatisation était donc nécessaire. [JO, Assemblée 
Nationale, 27 oct 1987, p 48933
It would also appear that nationalisation avoided much of the unpopularity which 
it had acquired in Britain through its association with the concept of the state 
[Hayward, 1983: 2233. Indeed, in a manner quite extraordinary to Anglo-American 
eyes, in France nationalisation has been given a form of constitutional 
protection through the requirement that enterprises with the character of a 
national public service or a monopoly of fact are to be public property (this 
will be discussed more fully below). Other Constitutional provisions have also 
had a major- effect on the privatisation programme, for example as regards 
pricing. Before examining these matters in more detail, it is necessary to 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
The major difference of^ principle is that the French Assembly, unlike the British 
Parliament, is not sovereign )̂in the sense of being in principle able to pass 
legislation on any matter whatsoever. Articlef34-) of the 1958 constitution sets 
out exhaustively the matters on which Parliament may pass legislation in the 
form of lois. These include such matters as civil rights, nationality, criminal 
procedure and penalties, and also, most relevantly here, 'les nationalisations 
d'entreprises et les transferts de propriété du secteur public au secteur privé'; 
the interpretation of these provisions by the Conseil Constitutionnel and the 
Conseil d'Etat have been of crucial importance. Matters not listed in Article 34 
are, by virtue of Article 37, of 'un caractère réglementaire' and so a matter for 
the issue of décrets by the executive without the need for Parliamentary
approval. ' The Government may also obtain Parliamentary consent for- a limited 
period under Article 38 to employ ordonnances in the area normally reserved for 
lois. ^
In Britain there is, of course, no judicial review of primary legislation; this is 
limited to delegated legislation made under statutory authority and, in some 
circumstances, under the Royal Prerogative. In France, two institutions exist 
for the judicial review of legislation and legislative proposals. The first is 
the Conseil d'Etat; this is the summit of the system of administrative courts 
which decides disputes between the public bodies and individuals in France, as 
well as possessing important consultative functions tsee generally Brown and 
Garner, 1983]. A décret will come within the category of administrative act 
subject to review by the Conseil, which can ensure that ‘ it does not trespass on 
the area reserved for Parliament and does not infringe the 'general principles 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
to review by the Conseil d'Etat; the nearest thing that exists to a comparative 
constraint is the role of the Conseil Constitutionnel. V
The Conseil Constitutionnel was introduced with the birth of the Fifth Republic 
in 1950 and was clearly intended by de Gaulle as an attempt to maintain the 
restrictions imposed on the power of Parliament; its 'main function and early 
activities marked it down as a watchdog on behalf of executive supremacy' 
[Hayward, 1983: 1391. It is composed of nine members, three being appointed by 
each of the President of the Republic, the President of the Senate and the 
President of the National Assembly for a period of nine years. In addition, any 
former President of the Republic is a life  member of the Conseil. 
Quantitatively, the bulk of its decisions concern alleged electoral 
irregularities; however, the most important role envisaged on the establishment 
of the Conseil was to prevent Parliament legislating outside the domain reserved 
for it by Article 34. Thus during legislative proceedings a proposal or 
amendment may be referred to the Conseil for a decision whether it is in the 
domain provided for lois (Article 41), and under Article 37 the Prime Minister 
may refer a lo i already enacted to the Conseil for it to determine whether it is 
within Article 34; i f  not the Government may then amend or repeal it by decret.
These functions of the Conseil Constitutionnel would then seem to mark it out 
as a means of preserving Governmental autonomy vis-a-vis Parliament. However, 
its other functions have marked it out as a protector of basic rights against 
government and legislature. Most importantly in the context of this study, in 
certain circumstances the Conseil can be asked to establish the compatibility of 
a loi with the Constitution, again before it has been finally promulgated. 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of the Assembly and the 
President of the Senate. However, in 1974 an important Constitutional amendment 
was introduced to the effect that reference might take place by 60 Deputies or 
60 Senators, and this has provided an important tool for the strengthening of 
Parliamentary powers over governmental legislative proposals (Article 61). This 
procedure has been used in the case of both nationalisation and privatisation, 
as we shall see.
The procedure has achieved added importance in view of the recognition of the 
rights referred to indirectly in the Preamble to the 1958 Constitution as 
enforceable by the Conseil as a basis for deciding that proposed lois are 
incompatible with the Constitution. These are the rights set out in the
Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme of Août 1789, and the 'principes
particulièrement nécessaires à notre temps' set out in the constitution of 1946. 
Doubts as to their enforcability were dispelled by the decision of the Conseil 
of 16 juillet 1971 holding provisions of a proposed lo i to be unconstitutional 
as infringing the right to freedom of association, and a number of decisions 
since then have adopted the same approach [see Rivero, 1984: esp. chapters 1,1 
and 11,1], There is, of course, no equivalent of this in the British Constitution 
with a sovereign Parliament; the role of the Conseil in assessing the 
compatibility of proposed legislation with the Constitution has been a major 
influence in giving the French privatisation process its particular character.
It is now time to examine the privatisation process in France to establish the 
effect of constitutional constraints and the continuing role of the state. This 
will be introduced by a brief description of the background of nationalisation, 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and,Britain
formed a powerful attraction for privatisation. There will then follow an 
account of the implementation of the privatisation programme considering the 
extent to which the government found itse lf faced with constitutional 
constraints limiting its freedom of action. Finally will be described some of 
the means for continuing governmental intervention in the affairs of privatised 
concerns to discover whether these suggest a greater degree of state 





























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
NATIONALISATION AND UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS
In Britain, a major factor justifying the pioneering privatisation programme has 
been the lack of legitimacy enjoyed by the nationalised industries. Reasons for 
this include the perennial problem of relations with government, and the lack of 
effective consumer representation [see generally Prosser, 19861. In France, 
institutional arrangements for nationalisation have been somewhat different, and 
major nationalisation took place in the early 1980s, much later than in Britain; 
a further difference being that it penetrated deeply into the internationally 
competitive sectors of the economy. Before- examining the French privatisation 
programme, it will be necessary to assess the degree to which the different 
arrangements there avoided the difficulties of nationalisation in Britain.
Some important background factors must be referred to. The first has been 
already described as part of the constitutional background; this is the greater 
legitimacy of the state in France and the history of more extended state 
economic activity. The second background factor is the very different 
organisation of capitalism in France: thus family ownership of commercial and 
industrial concerns has been extensive, and the stock market has not been a 
major source of finance in a way comparable to Britain. Nor are there pension 
funds to act as large institutional investors. This has meant that much finance 
has com'e from the banks, and in turn nationalisation of the banks has been of 
much greater importance than in Britain, the vast majority of them having been 
state-owned due to decisions taken in the 1940s and in 1982.
A further important aspect of business organisation is the existence of large 
holding companies with interests in a wide range of different areas of 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
examples of this in practice have been limited to such enterprises as the Post 
Office's National Girobank and the short lived attempt by the British Gas
Corporation to enter o il production. By contrast, in France nationalisation has 
included vast holding companies covering many different areas of the economy;
this was considerably increased by the nationalisation of holding companies in
1982, when around 3,500 subsidiaries were transferred to public ownership. As 
this suggests, there are also major differences in the sectors affected by
nationalisation in France and Britain. In France nationalisation of banks has 
assumed major importance whilst having been virtually non-existent across the 
channel. In addition, the nationalised industries have a much greater role in 
the competitive sector of the economy, and indeed in areas of international 
competition, than in Britain where the major public enterprises have been the 
transport and energy utilities. Of course, even in Britain some nationalised 
industries have faced important competitive pressures (notably the British Steel 
Corporation), but the nationalised sector has never reached the heart of the 
competitive economy as in France.
The institutional forms adopted for public ownership also differed in Britain 
and in France. In particular, the idea of representative boards and of 
tripartism, decisively rejected in the Morrisonian model of public enterprise in 
Britain, has been a central element in the institutional arrangements for public 
ownership in France. Thus in the major nationalised enterprises conseils 
d'administration were established containing representatives of the state, of 
employees and of consumers. The working out of this principle in practice has 
involved considerable difficulties. The first point to stress is that this 
system gave enormous power to government, although its viewpoint was often not 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
which often lacked any common vision. Until the 'lois Auroux' introduced direct 
elections for workers' representatives in 1982 these were also selected by the 
relevant minister after nominations from the trades unions. However, the
creation of a means of representing the consumer interest gave rise to the
greatest difficulties. In Britain, the attempted resolution of the problem was 
to set up consumer councils outside the enterprises; however, their powers were 
extremely limited and effects minimal. Some experimentation took place in •the 
1970s with the appointment of consumer members to some of the’ Boards, but this 
was very much at the margins of public enterprise decision-making and was 
short-lived and ineffectual. In France, the initial idea of government 
appointment of consumer representative was replaced in 1953 by the power to 
appoint persons chosen 'en raison de■leur compétence en màtiere industrielle et 
financière'. Once again, it is clear that such a vague definition gave enormous 
power to the designating minister and in 1982 new, even broader, provisions 
were introduced providing for the appointment of representatives of the
economic environment of the enterprise, though it seems that these were to play
only a limited role in practice. In addition, arrangements for Parliamentary 
accountability were weak; the powerful Parliamentary Sub-Committees which had 
scrutinised public enterprise under the IVth Republic did not survive 1958, 
though ad hoc inquiries have continued. The major form of outside scrutiny 
remains through the Cour des Comptes which took over scrutiny of the accounts 
and management of public enterprises in 1976.
If tripartism and Parliamentary accountability did not provide solutions to* the 
problem of accountability of nationalised enterprises to broader economic 
interests, it will be already apparent that the institutional arrangements 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
find litt le  success in regularising such intervention and opening it up to 
public accountability. Recognition of these problems is at the basis of the 
important Nora Report [Nora, 19671, recommending, In te r  alia , that the 
relations between government and enterprise be given a degree of continuity and 
the enterprise be given some guarantee of autonomy of management in specific 
areas through the drawing up of ‘programme contracts'. The essence of these 
contracts was to provide a framework of mutual commitment for five years ahead; 
the plans would be linked in with the French national planning process as a 
means of coordination with broader national objectives [for a general account of 
the use of contractual techniques in French planning see Bergsten, 19751. These 
were not, however, very successful, partly because of the disarray in which the 





























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
It thus appears that France had been litt le  more successful than Britain in
developing an orderly and legitimate system of relations between government and
public enterprises. This is not to deny that some enterprises, particularly 
Renault, had succeeded in gaining considerable autonomy from government; and 
that in other areas, such as the nuclear power programme, objectives of
government and industry have been substantially in accord. The recession of the 
late 1970s and 1980s, however, showed the severe strains to which the system 
had become subject. The Socialist Government and the Mitterand Presidency 
elected in 1981 nevertheless embarked on a major programme of nationalisation 
covering a major part of the French economy; thus the public sector in total now 
represented 24% of industrial employment, 32% of turnover and 60% of
investment. The importance of the new public sector was not merely numerical, 
however, for public enterprises were now at the heart of the competitive 
economy in France.
Did the 1982 nationalisations represent progress in resolving the problem of 
relations between the industries and government? In order for this to be 
properly understood, something must be said about the aims of nationalisation-, 
so that the degree of governmental involvement necessitated by public ownership 
can be assessed. The nationalisation proposals had a long gestation period, and 
in particular were the subject of fraught and lengthy negotiations between the 
Socialist and Communist Parties. In view of this it is hardly surprising that 
objectives became somewhat blurred and confused; not all the different 
objectives were fully worked out and some of them were likely to prove 
incompatible in practice. In addition, many of them clashed with the stress 
also placed by the new Government on autonomy of management for the industries 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
A number of governmental controls over the enterprises were loosened in the 
case of the 1982 nationalisations. This of course raises the question of how 
the enterprises were to be made the object to the myriad aspects of government 
policy for which it was claimed they would be an instrument. The answer was 
envisaged as through the negotiation of contrats de plan. These would provide 
a general framework for the establishment, for a number of years, o f stable 
mutual objectives between government and enterprise within which the latter 
could be permitted autonomy in management. It was through the contrats that 
the industries were to be incorporated in the broader process of national 
planning which the Socialist Government proposed to resurrect as a central 
element of its policies, and the unions were also to be closely involved in the 
drawing up of the plans so they would be one means of implementing industrial 
democracy. A relatively high degree of success was obtained in negotiating the 
contrats and in many ways the contrats were to show themselves as a much more 
successful means of regularising relations with government than had their 
predecessors; the concept of such plans attracted general support [see Haut 
Conseil du Secteur Public, 1984; Vcl I p 22; and vol II chs 1-3].
Certainly, the use of the contractual technique was a far more sophisticated 
means of regularising relations between public enterprises and government than 
anything attempted in Britain. However, two elements were of particular 
importance in weakening the effectiveness of the contrats de plan. The first 
was that they were envisaged as a part of a wider process of national planning. 
However, the attempt to revive the National Plan had only very limited effect; 
the planning minister had restricted influence, economic growth was slow and 
unpredictable and with the abolition of the Ministry of Planning in March 1983 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
the rapidly worsening financial position of many of the public enterprises made 
effective long-term planning impossible. In the case of the nationalised 
enterprises, the increased stress on commercial viability has been at the 
expense of the wider goals set out in the contrats and has favoured the 
development of greater commercial autonomy. The results have been summarised 
as follows:
The price for requiring financial order as the top priority 
for nationalised industries was according greater 
independence to their managers... although the Government 
continued to meddle intermittently in their affairs, rather 
than providing them with a clear set of directives, which 
is what they most constantly requested. Thus, the Left 
ran into the familiar problem when dealing with the 
nationalised sector: lack of autonomy could stifle
initiative and enterprise while independence involved 
inadequate control. [Machin and Wright, 1985: 22-3]
By stressing these problems, one could give the false impression that the 1982 
nationalisations were ineffectual and did not attain any of the Government's
aims. However, they were of extreme importance in two major respects. Firstly, 
far-reaching measures for restructuring the industries were put into effect, 
through the supply of state funds (for the enterprises had been starved of 
investment funds in the years before nationalisation) and through the promotion 
of mergers and shedding of marginal activities, especially in the chemical,
electronics and steel-making industries [see Zinsou, 1985; chs V-VII3. This
could not have occurred had the enterprises remained in the private sector, and 
was largely responsible for substantial improvements in the financial 
performance of the enterprises by 1984 in marked contrast to the serious
problems soon after nationalisation. Secondly, the Government was able to 
ensure that the industries continued to invest heavily despite the recession and 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
also some success in the development of industrial democracy, and the Conseils 
d'administration did provide a forum for increased dialogue between managers 
and workforce CZinsou 1985; pp 86-90 and Haut Conseil du Secteur Public,. 1984; 
Vol I, pp 119-28 and Vol II, p2603. The contractualisation of relations with 
government also held promise for the future, not least in providing
opportunities for dialogue and in encouraging the administration to speak with 
only one voice.
The nationalisations, then, had not provided a major means of government 
intervention in the economy; rather, their importance lay in industrial 
restructuring and investment. This raises an essential point; the major acts 
of restructuring and recapitalisation were essentially one-off; they did not
require continuing state ownership once the financial position of the
enterprises had been restored. Moreover, the many problems of developing 
acceptable forms of relationship with government continued, and were reminiscent 
of the problems which had occurred in Britain; as one writer has put it,
referring to the period 1982-3, 'these companies faced the worst of both worlds: 
they lacked global directions from the state to guide their long-term strategy, 
yet were subject to sporadic intervention into their daily operations' [Hall, 
1985: 903. One can see, therefore, that when a Government of the Right took 
power in 1986 the temptation to get rid of the problem through privatisation 
would be strong, and despite the strong tradition of state intervent ion, in the 
economy in France, this is precisely what occurred. Ironically, the very success 
in improving the finances of the enterprises under state ownership made 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
THE PRIVATISATION PROGRAMME: BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS.
Two important point need to be made about the background of the privatisation 
programme in France. The first is that lim ite d  privatisation took place in 
France long before the election of the Chirac Government in March 1986; indeed, 
the blurring of the public and private sectors and the existence of a large 
number of subsidiaries owned, in whole or in part, by nationalised holding 
companies rendered this inevitable. This cession of interests in subsidiaries, 
or the 'respiration* of the public sector, had given rise to particular legal 
problems before 1986 due to the existence of Art 34 of the Constitution of 
1958 requiring that 'la lo i fixe les règles concernant... les transferts de 
propriété d'entreprises du secteur public au secteur privé Csee Rapp, 19873. In 
the absence of legislation regulating the process, a large number of such 
cessions remained unlawful until 1987.
In addition to respiration there were other examples of French precursors to 
the privatisation programme. In Britain, plans to allow nationalised industries 
(notably British Telecom) to raise money on the markets to supplement 
government finance for investment foundered over difficulties in the role of 
government as guarantor. In France, by contrast, provision had been made in the 
lo i Delors of 1983 for the issue of t i t r e s  p a r t ic ip a t ifs  and c e r t i f ic a ts  
d 'investissem en t, a form of non-voting share,’ enabling the public enterprises to 
raise finance through the stock market, and these became an important source of 
investment funds.
A further example of moves towards the private at the expense of the public 
sector, this time also involving liberalisation as well as limited privatisation, 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
monopoly had been ended and a new High Authority set up to to accomplish a 
partial distancing of control of audio-visual matters from government. In early 
1986 authorisations for two new private television stations, 5 and TV6, were 
granted; a state radio company was sold also.
It is thus clear that important moves had taken place anticipating privatisation 
before the election of the conservative coalition in March 1986. However, there 
had’ been nothing resembling a full-scale privatisation programme. A second major 
point should now be made; despite the existence of this limited privatisation 
in practice, there was virtually no advocacy of a large-scale programme of 
privatisation even on the Right until the British experience showed that not 
only was such a programme possible but that it could have considerable political 
advantages of a short-term nature for governments. There was of course no 
shortage of revived neo-liberal ideas in France, particularly from the group 
writers associated with 'la nouvelle économie' [see for example Lepage, 1978; 
1980; 1985]. However, the remedy put forward for excessive state involvement in 
the economy was deregulation and exposing public enterprises to increased 
competition rather than extensive denationalisation; the fear was that the 
Bourse would be unable to cope with the sale of large numbers of shares on 
privatisation, and that, without special constitutional protection for 
privatisation, purchasers would not buy shares for fear of losing them with a 
change in political control.
In contrast, the British experience was important in showing that privatisation 
could be accomplished with considerable political ease; it was no longer part of 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
many forms of deregulation, and later writers used the experience as the basis 
for advocacy of a major five-year privatisation programme CJacquillat 1985]
Thus in a real sense the French programme of privatisation is parasitic on the 
British experience. It also contains a strongly ideological element similar to 
that of Britain and differentiating it from more pragmatic efforts in a number 
of other countries. It is thus not surprising that the justifications for 
privatisation given by Government spokesmen during the legislative process were 
also remarkably similar to the justifications provided in Britain. Thus in 
introducing the first projet de loi on privatisation, the Minister, Balladur, 
stressed the need for economic efficiency, claiming that the state could not act 
efficiently in modern economic conditions; that public ownership imposed rigid 
structures and resulted in the politicisation of state enterprises and 
unnecessary political intervention in their affairs. Public enterprises had not 
been economically successful and were accountable neither to the state nor to 
the market place; there was also a more general need to cut back the state and 
reduce public spending CJO, Assemblée Nationale 22 avril 1986: 210], All these 
arguments were familiar from Britain. A rather different aim should also be 
mentioned, however. In France the Bourse was of extremely limited importance in 
raising finance compared to other major capitalist countries. Privatisation 
through flotations on the Bourse could contribute to the growth of Paris as a 
financial centre.
When one comes to the implementation of privatisation, however, two rather 
-different themes from those in Britain are apparent. The first relates to the 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
o vera ll hostility to the state To quote the minister responsible for 
privatisation;
C'est là un sujet d'importance, qui reflèt bien notre 
conception de l'Etat. Elle n'est en rien hostile, par 
principe, à l'Etat. Elle lui réserve, à l'inverse, un rôle 
premier parce qu'éminent: celui de garantir aux citoyens un 
cadre solide et durable d'épanouissement, celui d'être un 
Etat fort car résolu, respecté car rassemblé sur 
l'essentiel et se défaisant de l'accessoire. CJO, Sénat, 21 
mai 1986: 7443.
Secondly, there is a strong stress on the intention of the government to act in 
an open way in implementing privatisation: according to the same minister 'les 
mesures adaptées seraient prises afin.que la plus grande transparence préside 
à ces opérations' [JO, Assemblée Nationale, 24 avril 1986: 3283. As these themes 
might suggest, the putting into effect of privatisation has been different in 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
IMPLEMENTING PRIVATISATION IN FRANCE.
In Britain the privatisation programme did not form a major part of the 
Conservative Party Manifestos of 1979 and 1983. In France, however, there was 
no doubt that success by the Right in the elections of March 1983 would lead to 
a substantial programme of privatisation, and in the first announcement by 
Jacket Chirac, the new Prime Minister, it was stated that privatisation would 
take place through the use of ordonnances. It will be recalled that this 
involves the passing of an empowering law through parliament, after which the 
Government may legislate for a limited period in the domain normally reserved 
for lois passing through Parliament in the normal way. The effect is, of 
course, to remove Parliamentary scrutiny of the details of the process and to 
remove the opportunity- for the Conseil Constitutionnel to declare the detailed 
legislation in breach of the Constitution. The only recourse left to deputies is 
to refer the empowering law to the Conseil, although of course ordonnances may 
be reviewed by the Conseil d'Etat as with other administrative acts. However, 
ordonnances require the signature of the President, and given that the Socialist 
Mitterand remained in place as President, this would be likely to prove the 
first test of the unusual situation of 'cohabitation' between Government and 
President of radically different political views. Thus constitutional issues 
became of importance in the implementation of privatisation from the outset.
The importance of the Presidential role was quickly confirmed when the President 
announced that he would refuse to sign ordonnances for the privatisation of 
concerns nationalised before 1981, or where arrangements for financial 
evaluation transgressed the rules established on nationalisation in. 1981 (which 
were relatively generous), or which put in peril the démocratisation of the 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
and included in them banks nationalised in 1945 as well as those of 1982, the 
agency Havas, nationalised by a loi of 1940, and a number of other enterprises 
pre-dating the 1982 socialist nationalisations. The list did not however 
include any of the major monopolistic enterprises, for example in the field of 
electricity, nor did it include Renault. The legislation was passed through
Parliament quickly (fuller discussion of the Parliamentary process will follow 
below), and was then referred tp the Conseil Constitutionnel, which concluded
[Dec no 86-207 DC of 25-6 juin 19861 that the legislation was not contrary to
the Constitution, but this was subject to a number of very important
qualifications regulating the way in which the detailed implementation of 
privatisation was to take place (fuller discussion of the decision will also 
follow below). Apart from its intrinsic importance, the decision provided an 
important weapon for the President, who acts a guardian of the Constitution and 
is able to refuse his signature to ordonnances. The decision of the Conseil 
giving conditional approval gave him an additional justification for exercising 
this power; the ordonnance would then have to be abandoned or transformed into 
a loi with the opportunities of Parliamentary scrutiny this gives and the 
opportunity for a further reference to the Conseil Constitutionnel [see M, 4 
Juillet 1986 and Matthieu, 1987: 712-223.
The loi came into effect on the Second of July 1986 [lo i no 86-793 du 2 juillet 
19863, and on the fourth of July the text of an Ordonnance implementing the 
details was sent to the Conseil d'Etat for its opinion. However, on 14 July in 
his Bastille Day speech the President announced that he would not sign the 
Ordonnance as it contained insufficient guarantees of national independence, 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
Constitutionnel. The inevitable result was that a draft loi was immediately 
introduced into Parliament and quickly passed.
This lo i came into effect on 6th August [Loi No 86-912 du 6 Aout 1986, JO 7 
A6ut 19861, and the two pieces of legislation make provision for the transfer of 
65 concerns in five years (compared to 47 concerns nationalised in 1982). 
Provision is also made for the lawful 'respiration' of the public sector through 
the establishment of an administrative procedure for the transfer to the private 
sector of subsidiaries and other interests held through holding companies. 
Provisions of the legislation will be discussed in more detail later; before 
doing so, however, it will be necessary to discuss the effect of constitutional 
arrangements on the scope and content of the legislation. Three aspects will be 
discussed; the scope and form of the legislation, the role of Parliament, and the 
role of the Conseil Constitutionnel in relation to pricing.
THE SCOPE AND FORM OF THE PRIVATISATION LEGISLATION
In Britain, by far the greatest controversy surrounding the privatisation 
process has concerned the sale of monopolies; in particular British Telecom, 
British Gas and, in the future, the electricity and water utilities. In 
particular, it has been suggested that the desire to obtain a successful 
flotation at a good price has prevailed over the desire to increase competition 
and hence economic efficiency. As a result concerns have not been split up on 
sale, and limited attempts have been made to encourage competition, thus 
increasing the attraction of the enterprise to potential investors whilst not 
doing anything to resolve the more difficult and deep-seated problems of 
economic efficiency [see eg Kay and Silberstron, 1984], Limiting competition 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
sale. Similar criticisms have been made of the failure to reallocate routes of 
British Airways before its sale. In France the situation has been quite 
different simply because privatisation has been aimed at the com petitive  sector 
of public ownership and the monopoly utilities, and enterprises in highly 
regulated markets such as Air France have been untouched.
Why this major difference in the scope of the programme? Part of the reason
lies in the distinction between the nationalised sectors in Britain and in
France; the latter contained far more competitive enterprises and so these could
themselves support a more extensive programme. Secondly, there is less of a
temptation to seek high proceeds since the proceeds of privatisation in France
cannot be used to fund current government expenditure [Loi 'no 86-824 du 11
juillet 1986, art 333. In Britain this has been precisely the role of the
proceeds and has resulted in artificially low public spending figures and the
opportunity for tax cuts. However, the most important reason for the relatively
limited scope of the French programme is the existence of a major constitutional
constraint on privatisation in the form of one of 'les principes politiques,
économiques et sociaux ... particulièrement nécessaires à notre temps' in the
Preamble to the 1946 Constitution, and providing that
Tout bien, toute entreprise, dont l'exploitation a ou 
acquiert les caractères d'un service public national ou 
d'un monopole de fait, doit devenir la propriété de la 
colléctivité.
This provision is incorporated into the Constitution of the Fifth Republic by its 
Preamble. Although there was some doubt as to the legal force of such
principles, it has become clear for some years that the Conseil Constitutionnel 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
breach [for acknowledgment of this in the in relation to the privatisation 
programme, see the Minister of State, JO Assemblée Nationale, 22 avril 1986, p 
2113. Thus a government wishing to privatise the monopoly utilities would be
faced with a choice between its legislation being held unconstitutional, a 
d ifficu lt and potentially unpopular constitutional amendment requiring a 
referendum or Presidential consent to a special Parliamentary procedure, or the 
opening up of markets to competition, precisely what has not occurred on a
-t
large scale in Britain.
Of course, there is no simple distinction between monopoly and competitive 
enterprises; rather the distinction is between different markets, and it can be 
argued that some of the enterprises already ceded come close to a monopoly 
position in the supply of certain goods. This argument was in fact considered 
by the Conseil Constitutionnel in examining the privatisation loi; the Conseil 
concluded that it had not been shown that the Government had made a manifest 
error in assessing whether the enterprises were in a situation of monopoly or 
not. The general point remains strong; there is a fundamental difference in the 
•scope of the privatisation programme in France from that in Britain, and 
constitutional provisions have provided a major constraint in this. Already, 
than one can begin to perceive the paradox that with a strong concept of the 
state, a government may be more constrained by the related constitutional 
provisions than with a 'stateless' tradition.
Important differences also exist in the form of the legislation from that in 
Britain. Thus in examining the provisions of the loi, what is at first striking 
is the detailed set of instructions as to the method of sale. In this sense the 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
are to cover a large number of enterprises rather than just the single one 
dealt with in most examples of British legislation. One might assume that the 
more detailed legal provisions compared to Britain would result in a more 
accurate picture of the privatisation process appearing in the legislation and 
in more effective parliamentary scrutiny. However, in fact a considerable 
degree of flexibility as to method of sale is preserved for the Minister; thus 
for example the loi does not lay down when a particular method of disposal is 
to be chosen, and the Minister is given the important power to dispose of 
interests in enterprises outside the market by mutual agreement (sale by 'gré à 
gré') and, as we shall see, this has been used extensively to set up 'hard cores' 
of investors in the enterprises at the time of disposal. What does create some 
inflexibility and constraint on the Government is the fact that the enterprises 
to be sold are listed in the legislation and there is an obligation to dispose 
of them before the end of the current legislature in 1991 (subject, of course, 
to a future loi repealing the obligation, now an inevitability with a change of 
Government). These two elements had not in fact figured in the Government's 
original projet de loi, but had been introduced after representations from 
rapporteurs of the Senate committees to the effect that to give the Government 
a discretion as to overall timing and as to which enterprises would be sold, 
would breach principles laid down by the Conseil Constitutionnel requiring a 
greater degree of precision in empowering legislation [see JO Sénat, 21 mai 
1986: 758-9]. Because of the Presidential veto the method of using ordonnances 
was not in fact applied. Nevertheless, this offers a further example of 





























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY
It has already been suggested that one of the important issues of cohabitation 
was the refusal of the President to sign ordonnances and his desire to permit 
Parliamentary debate on the privatisation provisions. However, even when the 
normal legislative process is used Parliament is in an extremely weak position 
under the Vth Republic. To avoid the frequent bringing down of governments by 
shifting majorities as had characterised the IVth Republic, a number of powerful 
tools have been provided to government to minimise the effect of parliamentary 
opposition, and these were used to the full.
It was necessary for the Government to act with as much speed as possible to 
enable the programme to be implemented in a single Parliament. The Left was 
determined to delay this as much as it could, and so borrowed a tactic used by 
the Right in opposing nationalisation in 1981; the tabling of a large number of 
amendments and requesting discussion of them. Thus in the Assemblée Nationale 
the Left tabled 624 amendments before the Government ended discussion; in 1981 
the Right had tabled 1438. It should also be recalled that the legislation 
provided for the whole of the privatisation programme rather than applying only 
to individual enterprises as in Britain. In fact, the bulk of the amendments 
sought to require (unsuccessfully) detailed discussion of the rationale for the 
privatisation of each individual enterprise.
In the case of the initial pro jet for the loi of habilitation, unlike for 
nationalisation in >*1981, the Government decided not to set up a special 
Commission to consider the projet of the loi, and instead 5 of the 6 
Parliamentary Commissions were to consider it. However, the Government cut 




























































































and litt le  progress was made in the other committees, some of them being
suspended sine die after accusations of obstruction on the part of the
Opposition CM, 19 avril 1986]. This meant that the commission stage was able to 
contribute little  to Parliamentary scrutiny. Discussion in the Assembly itse lf 
was highly generalised, concentrating on overall defences of nationalisation and 
of liberalism and saying little  about detailed institutional design. This was 
heightened by the refusal of the minister to defend the decision to sell each 
particular enterprise because he should not publicly say bad things about
enterprises owned by the state (!) CAN 5 mai 1986: 674]; a rule often broken in 
particular stages of debate, but which prevented any detailed justification
being given for the details of the programme. Instead there was simply an 
assertion that all competitive enterprises were potentially suitable for
privatisation.
Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
The discussion of the Articles of the projet de loi had reached article 5 when
the Government decided to engage its responsibility by use of Article 49(3) of
the Constitution CAN, 15 mai 1986: 915]. This provides that
Le Premier Ministre peut, après délibération du Conseil des 
Ministres, engager la responsabilité du Gouvernement 
devant l'Assemblée nationale sur le vote d'un texte. Dans 
ce cas, ce texte est considéré adopté, sauf si une motion 
de censure, déposée dans les vingt-quatre heures qui 
suivent, est votée dans les conditions prévues à l'alinéa 
précédent.
This had been expected for some time; authorisation had been given by the 
Council of Ministers to the Prime Minister at a very early stage. The reason 
given was obstruction from the Left, although this mechanism had not been used 
in relation to the major nationalisation legislation in 1981, only being invoked 
for the re-drafted legislation after the decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel. 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
and so the loi was considered adopted. Thus this Constitutional provision is a 
tool perfectly suited to a government wishing to limit debate on the contents 
of its proposals; although there may be good reasons for limiting blocking
tactics, so draconian a weapon severely limits the extent of Parliamentary
scrutiny. Articles 5-8 covering the implementation of privatisation were not 
voted by the Assembly, and articles 6-8 were not even debated, though under 
49(3) Government amendments were considered as incorporated in the text 
adopted. It is also worth noting that, despite the aggression sometimes shown 
in debate and the bulk of the amendments tabled, there was an impression that 
participants were simply going through the motions of opposition; the outcome 
was pre-ordained, and the battle was fought much less actively than that of
1981 CM, 8 mai 19861.
Article 49(3) is not available for the Government to use in the Senate;
however,it has other means of enforcing its will there. The first, in this case, 
is a much larger majority, and negotiations took place at an early stage to 
agree with the majority representatives that the Senate would approve the same 
text as the Assembly and so remove the need for a reference back CM, 26 avril 
19861. As a result, the Commission which examined the projet de loi before the 
debate did not recommend any amendments. The other device available is that of 
the block vote under Art 44 of the Constitution; this means that amendments may 
be discussed but no vote takes place on them; only amendments acceptable to the 
Government are considered in a vote. Nevertheless, the Left deposited over 400 
amendments; these usually gained no response from the Government except a 
recommendation of rejection. At the Government's request, Articles 2 and 3 were 
taken first and approved after block votes, as were the other articles after 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
to 102. The use of this block vote procedure had the desired result of 
producing a text identical with that previously adopted by the Assembly and so 
no reference back was needed. As we shall see in detail below, the loi was then 
referred to the Conseil Constitutionnel.
Although the result of these debates was clearly a foregone conclusion, there 
was at least discussion of issues of principle in both Houses. The same could 
not be said, however, about the second pro jet de loi, on the implementation of 
privatisation; this is particularly ironic in view of its origins as an 
ordonnance which the President had refused to sign so as to provide an 
opportunity for Parliamentary debate. After a brief meeting the Finance 
Commission recommended that no amendments be made to the pro jet: after 55 
minutes of debate, filled  by the Commission's Rapporter-General and by two 
ministers, Article 49(3) was brought into action and debate was suspended for 
the vote of censure. The censure motion was unsuccessful and the loi was 
adopted at first reading. The projet then passed to the Senate; the Rapporter- 
General and the two Ministers were heard and the Senate then voted to reject 
the pro jet on a preliminary question, as the Finance Commission had recommended. 
This was, however, only a procedural device, for the Government had earlier made 
a declaration of urgency in relation to the projet. This meant that on the 
rejection Article 45 came into play; in the case of disagreement between the two 
houses, the Prime Minister can call together a mixed commission of seven 
deputies and seven senateurs to propose a new text; this is then to be voted by 
each assembly, with no amendment permitted except with Governmental agreement. 
The commission made important changes on to the proposals, in particular 
relaxing the provisions restricting foreign ownership; as a result the loi was 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
had refused to sign. This version of the loi was then adopted after 70 minutes 
debate in the Assembly and half an hour in the Senate. It should also be added 
that the Government agreed to a debate on the implementation of privatisation 
on 27 October 1987, but this took the form of a debate involving only 
discussion with no vote Csee JO, Assemblée Nationale, 27 oct 1987: 4893-4918 
and M, 8 and 29 oct 19873. Nor was the debate of high quality; it was largely 
a ritual exchange on the merits or demerits of nationalisation with little  
discussion of the implementation of privatisation.
It is clear that government in France has a battery of techniques available to 
it to diminish Parliamentary debate, including the resort to ordonnances, the use 
of Article 49(3), the block vote and the procedure on disagreement between the 
Houses. This makes the availability of reference to the Conseil Constitutionnel 
of particular importance as it enables some real form of scrutiny of legislation 
to take place and provides one technique for legislators which is not so subject 
to Governmental control. It should, however, be remembered that the British 
Government also has a wide variety of techniques for use to ensure the passage 
of legislation in the form it desires. Debate in the British Parliament on 
privatisation has often been tediously prolonged, but has centred around the 
principle of privatisation (on which the Government is not likely to change its 
position), and it has not been' possible to discuss in detail such important 
matters as the method of sa le , and relations with government after disposal. 
One does have the added opportunity for debate offered by the fact that each 
major privatisation has required, its own legislation, rather than there being a 
general statute as in France, but each Act is very much a skeleton and little  
provision is made in it for the design of the privatised company, for methods of 




























































































addition, litt le  provision has been made for the gathering of outside views 
before privatisation; in the case of the British Gas sale, no White Paper or 
considered consultative paper was issued in advance, and in the case of British 
Telecom the White Paper CCmnd 8610] was highly superficial. A White Paper has 
also recently been issued for the proposed sale of the electricity industry, but 
this represents very much a statement of a position already taken by the 
Government after private political lobbying rather than an attempt to gain 
outside ideas and so improve the quality of debate [for the lobbying process 
see eg The Sunday Times. 28 Feb 19883. The Energy Select Committee of the 
House of Commons held an inquiry on regulation of the gas industry before the 
legislation came before Parliament in an attempt to improve the quality of 
debate, but this had limited effect in changing the governmental proposals [see 
generally Graham and Prosser, 1986: 22-43. In general, then, the privatisation 
process in Britain has been accompanied by fuller parliamentary debate but with 
limited effect in constraining the power of the Government.
There is one major difference in the tools available for members of Parliament 
in France and in Britain. In France there is the opportunity for them to refer 
draft legislation to the Conseil Constitutionnel; no equivalent exists over the 
Channel. This has had a major influence on the privatisation programme, both 
through the actual decisions of the Conseil and through 'autolimitation', ie the 
anticipation by government of a successful challenge in the Conseil and so the 
drafting of the legislation so as to avoid this. We have already seen something 
of,.this in restrictions imposed on the scope of the programme and the form of 
the legislation. I will now discuss an area of great controversy in the British 
privatisation programme where in France the influence of the Conseil has been 
considerable; that of the pricing of enterprises sold by the state.
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THE CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL, PRICING AND PRIVATISATION.
After the privatisation of monopoly utilities, the major issue of controversy in 
the British privatisation programme has been that of pricing. There has been 
considerable criticism from Opposition politicians that enterprises have been 
disposed of too cheaply; perhaps more importantly, this has been shared by 
academic commentators and the Public Accounts Committee of the House of 
Commons. Thus an analysis of the sale of public assets has concluded that 
'[whatever one's views about the desirability of a programme of privatisation, 
considerable concern must be felt about the techniques that have been employed 
in implementing the programme to date....costs have been high, primarily as a 
consequence of the underpricing of assets...' [Mayer and Meadowcroft, 1985: 55]. 
The Public Accounts Committee has expressed strong doubts as to whether the 
best return for the taxpayer has been received in a number of sales, including 
those of British Aerospace, Associated British Ports and British Telecom; it has 
also questioned the necessity for the considerable expense of underwriting such 
issues CHC 189, 1981-2: HC 443, 1983-4: HC 35, 1985-61. In relation to the more 
recent sales, the National Audit Office has also had difficulty in satisfying 
itse lf of an adequate financial return from sales [for British Gas see HC 22, 
1987-8: British Airways, HC 37, 1987-8: Rolls-Royce, HC 243, 1987-81 The 
problem is even more acute where the disposal does not take the form of an 
public offer of shares but a private disposal to a single buyer [see eg on the 
sale of Royal Ordnance, HC 162, 1987-81.
Why, it could be asked, would a Government wish to underprice a cession when a 
major aim of the privatisation programme is to raise funds? After all, other 
criticism has alleged that insufficient steps were made to introduce competition 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
also be suggested that pricing is simply a matter for the market, and that this
will automatically produce the most rational outcome. However the market here
does not represent some sort of extra-political rationality but is a creation of
government through its dealings with other actors; as an examination of the
flotation of British Telecom has suggested;
a strictly rational-actor view of the flotation would be 
quite wrong....Many decisions were reached by a process of 
interaction -  not negotiation exactly, but accommodation -  • 
amongst the interested parties, and often represented the 
outcome of political (in the loosest sense) processes -  
relations between brokers and institutions, favours owed 
to clients, relations between ■ banks, the views of 
Ministers, etc. In addition, of course, more or less all of 
the parties involved had a financial stake in the outcome...
[Hawkings, 1987; 33.
In this context two reasons can be identified which might lead to underpricing. 
The first is simply to ensure the success of the disposal and so to gain
political capital from this. It was clear that with the first of the large 
British flotations, that of British Telecom, a major determinant was the need to 
convince the sceptical financial institutions that the shares would be taken up 
by investors; as a result the institutions had a major influence in the setting 
of a cautiously low price [see Hawkings, 19873. Secondly, by disposing of 
interests cheaply, a government can attempt to maximise the number of
shareholders in privatised concerns. This in turn may provide an incentive for 
political support for that government by shareholders anxious to avoid any 
threat to their gains. In a country where privatisation has increased the 
number of shareholders 4-5 times to almost a quarter of the adult population,
this can clearly be a 'central political consideration, and Government
consciousness of it was confirmed when, before the 1987 general election, the 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain ,
in Labour constituencies warning them of the consequences of the latter Party's 
policy on renationalisation.
How, then, does pricing take place in British sales? The important point to 
stress is that the process is premised on the assumption that the sale of state 
assets is no different from a private transaction: there is no special
protection for any form of public interest here. Thus for example, in the cases 
of British Gas and British Airways, merchant banks were employed to act as 
financial advisers and this included giving advice on the price to be set; the 
Secretary of State also appointed an independent adviser to act as a means of 
cross-checking. However, the only public scrutiny of the process occurs
afterwards through examination by the National Audit Office and the Public 
Accounts Committee; moreover, the financial advisers will also be underwriters 
for the issue, thereby creating a potential conflict of interests, for they will 
have an incentive to price the issue low enough to ensure that there is no 
requirement for underwriters to take up unsold shares. In France, apart from 
the fact that underwriting has been deemed unnecessary, constitutional 
constraints have resulted in the creation of a more formally independent 
element in the decision as to pricing itself. This will now be described and an 
attempt made to compare the results of pricing in Britain and France.
The constitutional constraints on pricing are related to those laid down when 
the draft law on nationalisation was referred to the Conseil Constitutionnel by 
a group of deputies and senators, and was held to be contrary to the 
Constitution (decision of 16 January 1982); The Conseil decided that the
provisions of the Declaration of the Rights of Man applied to nationalisation 
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17 of the Declaration requiring just indemnity. One of the innovations was to 
establish an administrative commission to undertake the d ifficu lt task of 
evaluating the non-quoted banks, a model which was to influence the 
privatisation arrangements. In a second decision of 11 February 1982 the new 
law was declared in conformity with the Constitution.
As we have seen, the empowering loi on privatisation was also referred to the 
Conseil by Deputies and Senators [Dec no 86-207 DC of 25-6 juin 19863. The 
overall conclusion was that the legislation was ■ not contrary to the 
Constitution, but this was subject to a number of very important qualifications 
regulating the way in which the detailed implementation of privatisation was to 
take place. A central issue was the pricing of the enterprises to be 
privatised. The deputies had argued that it would be unconstitutional to sell 
enterprises below their true value as this would breach constitutional 
principles of equality and would give vendors an unfair advantage; indeed it was 
argued that the obligation to sell by 1991 could have precisely this effect, and 
could also lead to transfers to foreigners threatening national independence. 
The Conseil accepted that both the Constitutional principle of equality and the 
protection for rights of property in the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
prohibited the sale of public goods to private parties at a price below their 
value; these principles applied to the property of the state as well as to that 
of private, individuals. However, the Government had indicated that valuation 
would take place by independent experts who would ensure that sale was not 
below thevalue of the enterprise, and that it intended to include guarantees to 
preserve national independence in the ordonnances implementing the process. 
Moreover, the obligation to sell by 1991 was to be interpreted as an obligation 
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new legislation would have to be introduced. Thus the Government was to be
obliged to proceed by way of ordonnances which included provisions
selon lesquelles l'évaluation de la valeur des entreprises 
à transférer sera faite par des experts compétents 
totalement indépendants des acquéreurs éventuels; qu'elle 
sera conduite selon les méthodes objectives couramment 
pratiquées en matière de cession totale ou partielle 
d'actifs de sociétés en tenant compte, selon une 
pondération appropriée à chaque cas, de la valeur boursière 
des titres, de la valeur des actifs, des bénéfices réalisés, 
de l'existence des filiales et des perspectives d'avenir; 
que, de même, l'ordonnance devra interdire le transfert 
dans le cas où le prix proposé par les acquéreurs ne 
serait pas supérieur ou au moins égal à cette évaluation; 
que le choix des acquéreurs ne devra procéder d'aucun 
privilège; que l'indépendance nationale devra être 
préservée; que toute autre interprétation serait contraire 
à la Constitution...
Here than we have a major constitutional constraint on pricing. It is clear, in 
fact, that the Government had anticipated this response by the Conseil through 
proposing such an independent body of experts; this forms an example of 
'autolimitation', the phenomenon by which governments shape legislative proposals 
to avoid constitutional challenge [see Keeler and Stone, pp 175-6]. The basic 
rules of evaluation are governed by the lois of 2 Juillet and of 6 Aout. The 
former simply empowers the government to fix the rules for evaluation; the 
details are contained in the latter implementing the requirements set out by 
the Conseil Constitutionnel. Evaluation is to be carried out by a Privatisation 
Commission of 7 members, nominated by decree from those with experience of 
matters economic, financial and legal. They are prohibited from having 
interests in bodies buying capital in privatised, concerns ,̂ and from acquiring an 
interest in such a firm for five years after the ending of their functions. The 
Commission values the capital to be ceded and must render its evaluation public; 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
and take account, depending on the circumstances of each case, of the Bourse 
value, the value of assets, subsidiaries, the profits achieved and future 
prospects. The price is then set by the minister and must not be below the 
recommendation of the Commission, which must also be consulted at this stage; 
the Commission is also to give its opinion on the procedures for bringing the 
sale to market Cloi 86-912 du 6 août 1986, art 33. In the case of transfers of 
assets by the larger enterprises under the provisions on respiration, evaluation 
takes place on similar conditions by independent experts nominated by the 
enterprise, though there is no requirement of publication of the valuation in 
this case [ibid, art 20, and décret 86-1140 du 24 octobre 1986, arts 5-63. The 
Commission is also to be consulted and is to value the capital in the case of 
cessions outside the market to create a hard core of shareholders Cloi 86-912, 
art 4, Decret 86-1140, arts 2-33, and this has led to a further constraint 
imposed by the Conseil Constitutionnel. In its decision on the legislation for 
the reform of the audio-visual field [case no 86-217 DC of 18 septembre 19863 
it held that where a core of shares giving control of a company was ceded, the 
price must be at a sufficient premium to reflect this.
The role of the Privatisation Commission has also been considered by the Conseil 
d'Etat in a challenge to the cession of 11% of Elf-Acquitaine [Decision of 2 
février 1987: 3(2) RFDA, mars-avril 1987, pp 176-903. This established the 
important point that the opinion of the Commission need not be motivé (ie 
accompanied by reasons). In this connection, it should be noted that the 
minister has refused, on grounds of industrial and commercial secrecy, to make 
public the reports of the Commission or its minutes; however the latter have 
been made available to the rapporteur special of the commission of finances of 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
did however confirm that the Commission has to be consulted twice; firstly to 
set the value of the holding to be ceded and secondly to give its opinion on 
the price set by the minister. The decision of the Conseil also appeared to 
give the Commission considerable discretion in weighing the different factors 
against each other, though it should be noted that this was affected by the 
peculiarity of shares already being quoted on the Bourse and thus this factor 
playing an especially important role in valuation. The Commissaire du 
Gouvernment of the Conseil took pains to ’stress that, despite the technicality 
of the subject-matter, the Conseil should not be deterred from exercising full 
reviewing powers, and in future cases of the cession of whole concerns not 
already quoted on the Bourse closer control should be exercised. Nor did the 
fact that shares traded at an immediate premium of 14% suggest illegality in 
pricing; the Commissaire noted that in Britain premia had often been 
considerably greater.
The rejection of a requirement for motivation is unfortunate and has been 
criticised by academic writers; it does not maintain symmetry with the valuation 
body established for nationalisation, which was required to give reasons [see 
Bazex, 19871. Nevertheless, there is in France in principle greater transparency 
in the means of evaluation of enterprises than in Britain because of the 
existence of the Commission. Has this made a difference in practice in the 
implementation of the privatisation process itself?  This will now be assessed 
by examination of the results of the major sales carried out in Britain and 
France: comparison of discounts received at the end of  ̂ the first day of trading 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
Sales in Britain.
Company Gross Proceeds(£m) Discount end f ir s t  day (%)
O ffe r s  fo r  s a le
British Petroleum (1979) 290. 4 3
British Aerospace (1981) 148. 6 14
Cable and Wireless (1981) 223. 9 17
Amersham International (1982) 71.0 32
Assoc. British Ports (1983) 22. 0 23
Jaguar (1984) 293. 5 8
British Telecom (1984) 3915.6 92
British Aerospace (1985) 550. 7 22
B rito il (1985) 448. 8 22
Cable and Wireless (1985) 932. 9 1
British Gas (1986) 5434. 4 36
B ritish  Airways (1987) 900. 3 70
Rolls Royce (1987) 1362.5 73
British Airports Authority (1987) 918. 8 46
British Petroleum (1987) * *
*Comparable in fo rm a tio n  on th e  1987 BP s a le  cannot be g iv e n  because o f  th e
p e c u l ia r  c ircu m sta n ces  o f  th e  sa le (see  below). The T ru stee S a vings Bank
s a le  has been o m itte d  as a sp e c ia l case where p ro ceed s went to  th e  Company 
i t s e l f  r a th e r  than to  th e  Government.
Tender O ffe r s
B rito il (1982) 548. 8 -18
British Petroleum (1983) 565. 5 3
Cable and Wireless (1983) 275. 0 -2
Assoc. B ritish  Ports (1984) 52. 4 2
Enterprise Oil (1984) 392. 2 0





Company Value (FFrbn) Discount end f ir s t day (%)
Elf-Acquitaine (Sept 1986) 3. 3 30. 5
Saint Gobain (Nov 1986) 13. 5 19. 0
Paribas (Jan 1987) 17. 5 24. 2
SOGENAL (March 1987) 1. 5 35. 0
BTP (April 1987) 0. 4 23. 1
BIMP (April 1987) 0. 4 21. 4
TF-1 (April/June 1987) 3. 5 7. 9
Crédit Commercial (April 1987,) 4. 4 16. 8
CGE (May 1987) 20. 6 11. 4
Agence Havas (May 1987) 6. 4 8. 0
Société Générale (June 1987),. 22. 3 6. 1
Suez (October 1987) 19. 6 -18. 0
Matra (Jan 1988) 2. 0 14. 0
Source; Jenkinson  and Meyer, 1987, and Regards su r  l ' a c tu a l i té ,  136, p 9 
(up d a ted ). Note th a t th e  value i s  not id e n t ic a l  to  p ro ceed s  as th e re  was 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
It is thus clear that discounts have been large in both Britain and France, and 
similar results can be obtained by taking a longer period for analysis than 
simply the result at the end of the first day. However, French experience lacks 
the spectacular discounts associated with certain large offers for sale in 
Britain; the maximum French discount is 36% for SOGENAL; the maximum in Britain 
92% for British Telecom. In France two discounts out of 13 sales were over 
25%;. in Britain 6 out of 21. Moreover, the discounts in France for the largest 
sales have been relatively modest, whilst the excessively high discounts are 
especially characteristic o f the large-scale offers in Britain; the three sales 
of over £1000m (excluding the final BP offer) having produced discounts of 92%, 
36% and 73%. It also appears that there has been more effective learning from 
experience in France with relatively low discounts for recent issues. In 
Britain, by contrast, high discounts have characterised the more recent sales.
Of course, a variety of factors are likely to be at work here, including French 
learning from the experience across the Channel; however, it is possible to 
suggest tentatively that the arrangements for valuation in France have 
prevented extreme underpricing of the sort that has occurred with the largest 
British examples of privatisation. It should also be noted that the 
arrangements for independent valuation will apply to small-scale disposals not 
involving a public offer of shares. In Britain this process has been highly 
secretive and has also resulted in accusations of underpricing Csee Graham and 
Prosser, 1987: 24-30, and more recently on Royal Ordnance, HC 162, 1987-81. If 
the ^valuation of enterprises being sold has indeed been affected in this way, 
this represents a further fundamental effect of constitutional constraints in 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
In addition to the general effect of the valuation provisions on pricing, they 
were also important in shaping the reaction of the French Government to the 
stock market collapse in Autumn 1987. In Britain, the collapse meant that the 
largest privatisation of all, the final disposal of shares in BP, would have 
resulted in shares commencing trading well below the offer price, thus casting 
doubt on the future prospects for the privatisation programme. In the event, 
the Bank of England offered a 'safety net' to investors involving the re­
purchase of the shares for a figure below the offer price but expected to be 
well above the market price. In the event little  use was made of this because 
purchasing by the Kuwait Investment Office raised share prices, but what it 
arrangement amounted to was in effect a retrospective reduction in the price of 
BP shares to protect the future of the privatisation programme. ' In France the 
collapse had a similar effect, with shares in Suez commencing trading well below 
the offer price. However, a substantial reduction in the price would have taken 
it below the valuation of the Privatisation Commission which, it should be 
remembered, has to consider factors other than share price in its valuation, and 
such a reduction was ruled out and instead provision for deferred payment made 
[see FT 4 November 19873. The problems of the Suez sale were among the 
reasons for the suspension of the privatisation programme immediately 
afterwards, and in particular the delaying of the sale of Union des Assurances 
de Paris. This would have been one of the most important examples of 
privatisation as it formed France's largest institutional investor with stakes 
throughout the French economy; it was also headed by a close associate of the 
Prime Minister. In fact, its sale proved impossible before the Presidential 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
LINKS WITH GOVERNMENT
Further examples could be given of other constraints imposed by constitutional 
provisions in France, for example from privatisation of broadcasting and of the 
Crédit Agricole. However, the central point is clear: the most controversial
aspects of the privatisation process have assumed a quite different character in 
France from that in Britain, and an important influence in this has been the 
extra constraint imposed by constitutional arrangements associated with, the 
centrality given to the concept of the state. In Britain, government has been 
effectively untrammelled in implementing privatisation; Parliament has had 
minimal effect in causing modifications to legislative proposals and the courts 
have played no real role. It could perhaps be argued, however, that such
constitutional constraints are unnecessary in Britain because France is by 
nature and history a statist, highly interventionist society, whilst Britain is 
associated with economic liberalism and the market [for comparative accounts of 
political economy stressing the more central role of the state in France see 
Shonfield, 1965; esp ch V: Hall, 1986: Hayward, 1986]. Thus the free play of
market forces provides the necessary legitimation without the necessity for 
special constitutional constraints. The privatisation programme would on this 
analysis represent an extension of economic liberalism, and there would be no 
need for constraints on state action simply because the state would have no
role. In this section I will examine this theme in relation to the role of
government in the affairs of privatised companies.
One of the ’ main justifications offered for privatisation in both Britain- and 
France is that it will free the enterprises from the political pressures of the 





























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
Soyons bien clairs: faut-il que la vie des entreprises soit 
complètement déconnectée de la politique et des influences 
politiques? Notre réponse est oui! Complètement et 
définitivement! [The Minister of State for the Economy, of 
Finances and of Privatisation, JO, Assemblée Nationale, 27 
oct 1987, p 4916].
However, in both countries a number of devices have been retained linking 
government and privatised concerns; these take the form of powers over 
shareholdings, contractual links and governmental influence in the regulatory 
process. Only the first two will be discussed here as the latter in France 
would take us into the world of broadcasting reform and so outside the scope of 
this paper.
It should of course be remembered that many privatised concerns are inevitably 
surrounded by a pattern of strategic decisions to be determined by government. 
British examples are particularly strong in the field of energy policy, and 
include the licensing of o il and gas extraction in the North Sea, authorisation 
of gas imports and exports, and, most strikingly of all, the proposed obligation 
on the privatised electricity generating concerns to generate a proportion of 
their energy by means other than fossil fuels (in practice, through nuclear 
power). Government also retains an important role in the regulatory apparatus 
established on privatisation. Once more, the difference in scope between the 
French and British privatisation programmes is important here, for thé monopoly 
utilities which require the largest remaining, regulatory role for government 
have simply not been privatised in France. ’ However, in addition to these 
general powers a number of special devices have been created on privatisation 





























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
GOLDEN SHARES.
'Golden shares' have been adopted in the majority of examples of privatisation 
of a major enterprise in Britain, the major exceptions being BP, Associated 
British Ports and Royal Ordnance. The central aim is to prevent takeovers and 
changes in control not desired by the Government [for further details of 'golden 
shares' see Graham and Prosser, 1987: 36-8]. In the case of Britoil and 
Enterprise Oil, a special share retained by government is given a majority of 
votes' and power to call an extraordinary general meeting i f  any person acting 
alone or in a 'concert party' makes an offer for 50% of the voting rights, or is 
entitled to control over 50% of such rights. In the other examples, there is a 
limit of 15% on shareholdings, and this is entrenched against variation without 
the consent of the special shareholder, ie the government. In some cases 
disposal of more than 25% of the company's assets also requires the special 
shareholder's consent.
One particular objective is clearly to prevent foreign takeover of important 
companies. However, to express this directly would lead to problems of 
community law [see especially arts 221 and 52 of the EEC Treaty], and so the 
provisions have usually made no reference to nationality and cover any proposed 
takeover. However, in the case of British Aerospace, Rolls-Royce and British 
Airways there are * explicit limitations on foreign shareholdings. In the former 
two cases this takes advantage of art 223 of the Treaty of Rome giving 
exemption for military production; the latter is more questionable. Indeed, at 
the time of writing the EEC Commission is investigating whether the Rolls-Royce 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
The effect of these provisions is to replace a fundamental spur to management 
efficiency, the 'market for corporate control', with the need to negotiate a 
takeover with government, even though government will retain no ordinary 
shareholding in the company. The provision has already assumed great 
importance in the case of the takeover by BP of Britoil. Use of the golden 
share was here hindered by its bad drafting; this particular model did not 
provide government with powers to prevent the takeover, but only to outvote the 
new owners on the Board of the Company, and so, for example, to appoint its own 
directors. In practice, the existence of the share was used as the basis for 
negotiations with BP which eventually extracted assurances on the future rate 
of exploration in the North Sea, the location of the Britoil headquarters and 
research, and the composition of the new Britoil board; having extracted these 
assurances the Minister then agreed not to use the golden share powers [see 
128 HC Debs cols 149-60, 23 Feb 1988]. The importance of this example lies in 
the fact that even the most limited golden share provision has provided 
government with an important mode of policy intervention after privatisation, 
and that even a publicly non-interventionist Government is prepared to use it.
In France, it will be recalled that the Conseil Const itutionnel stressed the 
constitutional status of the need to preserve national independence. Moreover, 
given the greater tradition of state intervention in France one would assume 
that stronger provisions would exist retaining residual powers in governmental 
hands than in Britain. The empowering lo i for privatisation enabled the 
government to fix rules for the protection of national interests, and the 
relevant provisions are contained in Arts 9 and 10 of the loi on the 
implementation of privatisation [loi 86-912 du 6 aout 1986]. Article 9 provides 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
cession o f  sa le s  through the financia l markets, no individual or institution may 
acquire more than 5% of the shares. Article 10 similarly provides that, at the  
time o f  any cession o f  in te re s ts , no more than 20% of capital may come under 
foreign control, and that figure may be lowered by the minister when national 
interests require it.
In the case of the golden share proper, the minister, after consulting the 
Privatisation Commission, is to determine whether the protection of national 
interests requires his taking a special share, which would require his consent 
for any person (or several persons acting in concert), to hold more than 10% of 
capital. This special share can at any time be transformed by the minister into 
an ordinary share; it ceases to have effect anyway after five years. For 
enterprises the principal activity of which falls under arts 55, 56 and 223 of 
the EEC Treaty foreign holdings in excess of 5% require ministerial consent. 
These articles refer to activities connected with the exercise of o ffic ia l 
authority, special treatment of foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, 
public security or public health, and the production or trade in arms, munitions 
and war materials. In the case of breach of the provisions on shareholding, the 
right to vote is lost and the shares must be sold within three months (for 
provisions as to forced disposal see décret no 86-1141 du 25 Octobre 1986). 
Further provisions exist in the audio-visual field, including a permanent 20% 
limit on foreign ownership of television or radio companies, which is however, 
stated to be subject to France's international obligations [lo i 86-1067 du 30 
sept 1986, arts 40, 63]
The provisions are, in fact, somewhat weaker than those in the original 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
protect national independence. It should also be stressed that the provisions
on shareholding give fewer powers to government than do their British 
equivalents. For example, the special share must expire after 5 years and nor 
are disposals of assets subject to special consent. It would not be incorrect 
to conclude from this that the special share provision was likely to be operated 
in France in a somewhat half-hearted fashion, and this was in fact prefigured 
by disputes within government as to whether a special share was desirable at
't
all. In fact, a special share has been taken by the minister infrequently. It 
was taken in the case of Elf-Acquitaine, unsurprisingly in view of the highly 
internationalised nature of the petroleum and chemicals business and the great 
importance of Elf in the national economy. Special shares were also taken in 
the cases of Matra with its strong military links and in the case of Bull when 
a capital augmentation took place. In the case of Havas the introduction of a 
special share was welcomed by the directors on the grounds that the group's 
capitalisation was relatively weak and and it would have difficulty resisting a 
foreign takeover bid. However, the special share was not taken in the other 
privatisations, including the cases of Saint Gobain, Paribas, Société Générale, 
Compagnie Générale d'Electricité, Compagnie Générale de Constructions
Téléphoniques, Suez and the banks. Its purpose seems temporarily to protect
concerns especially vulnerable to foreign takeover, rather than to provide a 
more general form of governmental intervention.
There is also a body of general law limiting the participation of foreign
investors in French companies. This remains in place despite loosenings of 
foreign exchange controls, and the junior minister for privatisation stressed 
that it would be used to protect privatised companies [JO, Sénat 31 mai 1986 p




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and* Britain
restrict investment from within the EEC [see now the circular of 21 mai 1987, 
JO 23 mai 1987, p 56561.
In conclusion, then, we find that, contrary to stereotypes as to the comparative 
roles of the state in the two countries, the golden share provisions provide a 
much weaker form of intervention after privatisation in France than in Britain. 
The society with a stronger concept of the state and a greater history of 
governmental intervention does not find this reflected in wider powers of 
intervention. However, to assess this effectively we need to consider another 
means of state influence over privatised concerns in France.
HARD CORES
The provision for the creation of hard cores ('noyaux durs') of investors to 
whom a proportion of the capital on privatisation is allocated by the Government 
is contained in art 4 of the août law on the modes of application of 
privatisation Cloi 86-912 du 6 août 19861. This empowers the minister to
choose outside the financial markets the acquirer of an interest after receiving 
the opinion of the Privatisation Commission. Further provision is made in 
décret no 86-1140 of 24 October 1986. This confirms that such sale may only 
take place after consulting the Commission, and provides for preliminary 
publicity. The disposal can then only take place after the Commission has fixed 
the value of the interests to be ceded. It should be noted that there is no 
provision requiring the minister's decision to be motivé. Much stronger 
provision has been made in the field of broadcasting, where, under art 58 of loi 
86-1067 du 30 sept, 1986, 507# of the capital of TF-1, the premier television 
chain, was to be ceded to group of acquirers chosen by the new regulatory 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
although the actual decisions have been lacking in detailed reasoning as to why 
a particular result was preferred CJO 8 avril 1987, pp 4008-9, and 29 avril, pp 
4792-33.
What is the purpose of the hard cores? Their presence is a reflection of the 
lack of large institutional shareholders in France in comparison with the United 
Kingdom. . If all shares were disposed of on the financial markets it would be 
likely that control would be divided amongst a large number of small 
shareholders, and the company would be at the mercy of raiders. Thus 
conditions have been attached to the shares sold to the hard cores; in 
enterprises covered by the privatisation loi the members of the hard core have 
been prohibited from disposing of their shares for a period of two years, and 
for the following three years could only sell to the Company itse lf or acquirers 
approved by it. As regards TF-1, a change in the composition of capital is a 
ground for the withdrawal of the authorisation to broadcast. In return for the 
clear advantages of control offered by membership of the hard core, the Conseil 
Constitutionnel has decided in its judgement on the broadcasting law that shares 
must be offered at a premium above those sold on the financial markets 
[decision no 86-217 DC, AJDA 20 fév 1987, pp 102-113. This premium has varied 
considerably from case to case; in the case of Paribas it was 2.5%, in the case 
of TF-1 33%, for BIMP 45%, for CCF 4%, for Havas 8% and for Suez 5%.
In contrast to the case of the golden share, the system of hard cores has been 
used extensively in the privatisation programme, being employed in all the fu ll 
privatisations apart from Saint-gobain and Compagnie Générale d'Electricité, in 
both of which natural hard cores existed in the form of bank holdings created 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
divided between 17 investors; for Crédit Commercial de France 30% between 9; for 
Havas 20% between 6; for Société-Général of 25.6% between 19 and for Suez a 
core of 28% of capital was created, divided between 23 investors.
The use of the hard core has been the most heavily criticised aspect of the 
implementation of the privatisation programme in France. The criticisms have 
taken two major forms. The first, made more credible because of the lack of 
any requirement of reasons for the allocation of the hard core, is that it has 
been used to reward political supporters of the Government. According to 
Government sources, the criteria for choosing an investor are its likely 
stability, level of participation before nationalisation, the justifications 
offered by the investor for taking a participation and the future development of 
the privatised company LM supp 13 june 1987, and see the Minister, JO, Assemblée 
Nationale, 27 oct 1987: pp 4894-53. After criticism of allocations, however, new 
criteria (now breached) were added to the effect that no investor would be 
favoured in more than two privatisations. However, allegations of political 
favouritism have been made more credible by the intense personal involvement of 
the minister in the allocations of hard cores Csee eg JO, Assemblée Nationale, 
27 oct 1987: p 48953.
The second criticism is of the intense concentration of interests caused by the 
highly incestuous nature of the allocation of the hard cores. Although no 
investor was initially awarded an interest in more than two hard cores, a dozen 
groups were given two participations and" with the privatisation of Suez a third 
participation was permitted. Moreover, a large number of complex links have 
been built up between the investors involved. A detailed analysis of the hard 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
about to be privatised and a smaller number of private concerns; between them 
they had a highly concentrated and complex pattern of holdings in each other; 
'Tout se passe en circuit fermé: les 'deux cent families' de naguère sont-elles 
devenues les 'cinquante-deux amis'?' Moreover, within these links there was 
concentration around three particular poles; CGE/Société-General, Paribas and 
Saint Gobain CM, 17 sept 19871. This was reinforced by the Suez hard core 
later; the largest elements in the core were awarded to Saint-Gobain and Elf- -
-i
Acquitaine, whilst the three insurance groups UAP, AGF and GAN were able to 
make this their third hard core participation, breaking the rule laid down 
previously by the minister that two would be the maximum. Moreover, since 
privatisation the hard cores have been reinforced through their participants 
purchasing shares sold by small investors with the collapse in share prices; 
thus for example the hard core of Suez now represents over 50% of its capital 
[for details of the augmentations see M supp 28 mai 19881. Indeed, some 
serious degree of concentration would seem hard to avoid because in France 
there are only 70-100 groups with the means to participate in the system of 
hard cores.
It is clear, then, that the creation of hard cores represents a major form of 
governmental influence which has occurred through a highly closed process 
involving a major exercise of public power, and this would appear to confirm the 
conventional view of French capitalism as involving a strong étatist element. ■* 
However, other factors need to be borne in mind which rather reduce the force 
of this view. Though the allegations of political placemanship may be w ell' 
founded, the importance of the hard core holdings in practice can be 
exaggerated. As has been noted above, they are divided between a large number 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
create any real engagement in the enterprise for the investor. In addition, the 
new Government is pledged to break up the hard cores. At the time of writing, 
the Minister has suggested that this will be done simply by removing the 
obligation to hold shares for a period of time, thus letting the market take its 
course, probably resulting in fewer but larger shareholdings not determined by 
political favouritism and with investors more committed to the enterprise [see M 
17 mai 1988 and M supp 28 mai 1988]. It should however be recalled that a 
number of participants in the hard cores will remain under public ownership 
with the change of government, thus providing a potential means of state 
influence. We must wait until we have a clearer idea of the intentions of the 
new Government before reaching a conclusion on this.
It should also be recalled that the idyllic view of the British privatisation 
programme as operating solely through the competitive financial markets and 
public offers for sale is seriously misleading. Though the disposals of large 
enterprises have largely taken this form, there has also been extensive 
disposals through highly secretive negotiations with private bidders. At the 
time of writing, the planned sale of the Rover group to the (privatised) British 
Aerospace is under investigation by the European Commission because of the 
financial arrangements involved; BAe is paying £150 million whilst the 
Government is writing o ff £1.1 billion of losses and injecting £800 million of 
new capital into the business to enable the sale ,to take place. This is, 
however, merely the most recent example of such private sales, earlier cases 
having included British Rail Hotels and its ferry ând hovercraft operations, 
British Gas* onshore o il operation, the warship yards of British Shipbuilders, 
the National Bus Company (split into a number of smaller concerns), and a number 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
information see Graham and Prosser, 1987: 24-301. These operations have
generally been shrouded in secrecy; for example, in the case of the British 
Shipbuilders warship yards the British Shipbuilders Act 1983 had given the 
minister power to direct the Corporation to discontinue particular activities 
and dispose of assets, and it was told to sell its profitable warship yards only 
a matter of hours before the Secretary of State made a public announcement to 
this effect. No flotation took place; instead private bidding was adopted thus 
making unnecessary public disclosure of information through a fu ll prospectus.
It should be noted also that in France sale outside the financial markets can 
only take place after the Privatisation Commission has fixed the value of the 
interests to be ceded [lo i 86-912 du 6 août 1986 art 4 and décret 86-1140 du 
24 oct 19861. In Britain there is no requirement of such independent valuation, 
and the Public Accounts Committee has criticised sale by private treaty as 
resulting in a price which may not reflect true market values where there is 
not strong competition in the tendering process, as failing to provide 
information about the whole market's view of the selling price, and as loading 
the dice in favour of the purchaser in those cases where tax losses were a 
factor in agreeing the price CHC 34, 1985-61. The Committee has also criticised 
the disposal of parts of the British Steel Corporation as having favoured the 
private sector CHC 307, 1*984-5], and the National Audit Office has noted that 
the proceeds from the sal>e of Royal Ordnance 'were significantly less than the 
public investment in the Company, as measured by its net asset value' [HC 162, 
1987-81. Examination by. the Office is made significantly more difficult in 
these cases because it will not have access to the books and records of the 





























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
A final point need also be made in relation to the comparison between hard 
cores and British arrangements for sale. Even in the large sales such as
British Gas, it is not true that all shares are placed competitively through the 
financial markets, for as part of the underwriting arrangements a number of 
shares are firmly placed in advance in the hands of British and overseas
investors. Others are provisionally placed subject to oversubscription in the 
public offer. Far from a premium being payable as required in France, 
commission is paid to the institutions for agreeing to take up shares. In the 
case of the British Gas sale, after clawback due to oversubscription, 23% of 
shares were sold in this way to British institutions, and 11% overseas; for 
British Airways the figures were 36% and 16%. No accusations of political 
favoritism on the French pattern have been made here, nevertheless the
arrangements are far from the liberal model of a large number of shareholders 
operating through competitive financial markets.
The creation of hard cores, then, has provided a controversial means of
government intervention in privatised companies after their sale. However, they 
do not represent a fully-fledged means of interventionism, and are likely soon 
to be broken up by a return to the market. Moreover, similar operations 
outside the financial markets do exist in British privatisation, and are not 
subject to the protection of independent valuation. Again we find that the view 
of the French state as interventionist in a way which the British state is not 
to be misleading, and indeed there is a degree of outside scrutiny available in 
France which does not exist in Britain. This will also become evident in the 





























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
PRIVATISATION, GOVERNMENT AND CONTRACTING
In Britain it is inevitable that a number of important privatised concerns will 
retain close links with government through contract. Examples are the defence- 
oriented British Aerospace, Rolls-Royce, the warship yards of British 
Shipbuilders, the Royal Dockyards and Royal Ordnance. Contractual relations can 
in principle result in a considerable degree of governmental intervention; for 
example, after a major Anglo-American conference on public and private 
interdependence it was reported that there was 'general agreement that the US 
Government has achieved a greater degree of de fa cto  management control over 
the aerospace industry through the contract device than the British Government 
has achieved by nationalising certain industries' [Smith, 1971: 193. In addition, 
the contractual links may be manipulated to influence the finances of a concern 
on privatisation through giving a guarantee of firm orders to potential 
purchasers. There have already been allegations that this has taken place in 
relation to the sale of shipyards in Britain [see Graham and Prosser, 1987: 43- 
53, and in the case of Royal Ordnance special agreements were reached 
committing the Ministry of Defence to purchase at least 80% of its requirement 
for explosives and -propellant for five years and the bulk of small arms 
ammunition for three years from the privatised company [see HC 162, 1987-81.
English law is remarkably lacking in legal controls over the process of 
government contracting, both in relation to the selection of contractors and 
deciding terms:
the Government enjoys almost unfettered freedom and total 
immunity from judicial review by reason of the absence of 
general rules of domestic law to control this 
process...[government enjoys far greater freedom and 
discretion in the elaboration of contractual schemes of 
regulation than it could reasonably hope to possess as the 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
Parliament [Daintith, 1979: 59].
Moreover, recent extensions of the scope of judicial review seem to have left 
pre-contractual decisions of government largely untouched. There are a number 
of Directives and Decisions in Community Law which govern the award of public 
works and public supplies contracts, but many of the key areas of privatisation 
are excluded from their application, including defence contracting. The central 
institutional means of scrutiny of government contracting in Britain is the 
Public Accounts Committee in association with the 'National Audit Office, but 
this scrutiny is inherently ad hoc and ex p o st facto; moreover, the Office will 
not have access to the books and records of contractors but only to information 
in departmental files.
In France, by contrast, recognition of the techniques of government by contract 
is much more fully developed, as is the special regime of legal supervision, 
though major areas of controversy remain. Only a very brief outline of the 
relevant law can be given here. By way of introduction, it should be stressed 
that in France there are two different legal regimes which are relevant to 
contracts. There is the normal system of law dealing with civ il law contracts 
between private parties and certain government contracts, but there is also the 
special regime dealing with the contrat administratif. This will be under the 
jurisdiction of the system of administrative law courts, in particular the 
Conseil d'Etat; the latter has developed a sophisticated body of special rules in 
relation to the enforcement and execution of the contract [for a summary see 
Brown and Garner pp 125-31]. More importantly for our purposes, .there may also 
be a complex set of procedures and standard terms governing the making of 
administrative contracts, incorporating requirements of open competition, 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
considerably depending on the nature and terms of the contract and cannot be 
summarised here; however, they are enforceable in the administrative courts [for 
such provisions see generally A de Laubadère et al, 1983, Tome 1, Livre II, 
Titres III-IV3.
One example of such special rules applies where the supply of goods to 
government falls within the category, of 'les marchés publics industriels'. This 
will occur where, because of the technological complexity of the subject-matter, 
the state needs to supervise the construction of the product in a way which 
does not take place in the ordinary case of supplies to government. Examples 
are in defence and especially armaments, but also in the areas of aeronautics 
and telecommunications. In such cases the normal requirements of publicity and 
competitive tendering may not apply because only one contractor will have made 
the necessary investment for construction of the required goods, but 
nevertheless a special set of detailed standard clauses exists for such 
purchases and is published. The extended powers of state supervision will bring 
such contracts within the powers of the administrative courts [see on this area 
Laubadère et al, 1983: 274-63. A number of firms privatised in the current 
programme do perform work of precisely this nature; obvious examples are Matra 
with its important defence and aerospace role, and Compagnie générale 
d’électricité and Compagnie générale de Constructions téléphoniques, which share 
the domestic market in the supply of telephone switch equipment.
Also of potential importance for the ^future of privatised industries is the area 
not of supplies but of 'government by contract' proper. The use of contractual 
techniques as a means of regulation in France has a long history, for example 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
contractual linkages both between different governmental institutions and 
between government and private actors including private companies and 
representatives of particular sectors or areas of business Cfor a summary, see 
Bergsten, 1975]. Moreover, the use of contractual techniques grew rapidly from 
the nineteen-seventies onwards, and the loi on the reform of planning of 1982 
makes provision for the conclusion of contrats de plan with private firms as 
well as .public enterprises. The future role of planning in France is currently 
a matter of some controversy, and the policies of the new Government are not 
yet clear, but it would appear that an important role for planning is likely to 
continue with the use of revised institutional machinery. Even if  the formal 
contractual technique linked to the process of planification is not to be used 
extensively in relation to privatised concerns, however, less formal arrangements 
in contractual form have in the past been used extensively with private 
companies. The degree to which these will be used to link privatised concerns 
with government must await greater experience of the future of these concerns 
and the resolution of the current debate on the future of planification, but 
given the importance of privatised concerns as economic actors it would appear 
likely that this could well be an important form of relationship.
The legal regime for contracts of this nature also shows considerable 
sophistication compared to the relevant law in Britain. In particular, challenge 
of the çontractual terms or of an apparent breach of the contract, on the basis 
of excès de pouvoir, has developed considerably in scope in recent years. This 
challenge may come from the parties themselves or from third parties;- the latter 
is of particular importance as such third parties will not be able to use the 
normal contractual remedies. The position of third parties is also crucial 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
contract. Though in principle such review is not within the powers of the 
administrative courts, this doctrine has been considerably weakened by the 
willingness of the courts to allow challenge (including that by third parties) 
of a c te s  détachables from the contract itself; these are administrative acts 
gaining their authority from outside the contract itself, and may included such 
things as the decision to enter into the contract, the failure to obtain 
required consents, and a decision by a public authority to confirm or ratify a 
contract through an administrative act. Thus, for example, Friends of the Earth 
was able to challenge successfully a contract entered into by a minister with a 
private steel company for the regulation of pollution, the Conseil d'Etat holding 
the decision of the minister to enter into the contract was unlawful when he 
had been given a number of statutory powers to police pollution which should 
have been used instead [Les amis de terre. CE 8 Mars 1985 RFDA 1985 363-61. 
Similarly, third parties have been allowed to challenge the terms of decisions 
allocating television and radio franchises by contractual means, both in relation 
to the award of contracts and their premature termination [Compagnie 
Luxembourgoise de télévision. CE 16 avril 1986; Syndicat de l'armagnac et al. CE 
17 décembre 1986, Société TV6 et al, CE 2 février 1987; and Société France 5j CE 
2 février 1987; see RFDA (1987), pp 1-431. Such challenge would not be possible 
on the basis of existing law in the somewhat similar system for the award of 
television franchises in Britain [see R v Independent Broadcasting Authority ex 
parte the Rank Organist ion PLC. Court of Appeal, March 26, 19861.
Although contractual techniques represent a tool of government in Britain, they 
are more fully developed in France in the field of planning, and this does give 
some support to the idea of France as the more étatist of the two countries. 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in France and Britain
the legal challenge of the use of contractual techniques as a means of 
regulation in France, far more so than exist in Britain. Once more we find 
that the strong concept of the state is accompanied by a more sophisticated 
system of legal constraint and regulation on government, a system which may 
give significantly greater powers of challenge to private parties and permit 
much fuller public scrutiny. It is now time to draw together the threads of 
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CONCLUSIONS
Two central arguments have thus emerged from our examination of privatisation 
in France and Britain. The retention of links between government and privatised 
concerns suggests that Britain maintains powers of economic intervention no 
less than does France, whilst in the privatisation process there are greater 
constitutional restraints on government in France, supposedly the land of a 
strong state.
•>
Before saying more about the implications of these findings, I need to deal with 
a couple of potential objections to this analysis. The first is that 
privatisation is intrinsically an exceptional case. Rather than its 
implementation representing an extension of state power, it is a means of 
destatisation, of the state limiting its own powers. Thus we could expect this 
tV-he-subject to greater constraints where there is a tradition of strong state 
intervention. The powers described in the latter part of this paper, however, 
suggest that privatisation cannot be seen simply as destatisation, and indeed in 
France both the minister responsible for the programme and the Prime Minister 
have been at pains to suggest that the two are not the same. It is also 
important to note that the French constitutional constraints described, in 
particular the power to refer to the Conseil Constitutionnel and the reviewing 
powers of the Conseil d'Etat, are certainly not peculiar to the privatisation 
process but apply across the range of government policies. Indeed, the Conseil 
Constitutionnel had a major influence on the nationalisation process in ,1932.
Secondly, it could be objected that the French privatisation programme is an 
unrepresentative example of policy-making because it occurred in the period of 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in Britain and France
the refusal of the President to sign ordonnances in this case achieved very
little , for the Parliamentary scrutiny of the resulting lo i was at best cursory 
and in fact the provisions in the lo i were weaker in protecting national 
interests than in the original ordonnance. What was important was the role of 
Conseil Const it utionnel in shaping the contents of the ordonnance and loi, and 
this was in no way contingent on the circumstances of cohabitation, for the 
reference came from deputies and senators, not from the President. The role of 
the President also made the constitutional amendment more difficult, but this 
was never really a possibility for other reasons. It thus seems that there is 
scope for drawing general lessons on public policy formation from the
privatisation process.
The general conclusion must be that any simple conception of France as a
country of the strong state and of Britain as a country of liberalism needs
serious reconsideration. This is not to deny that there is a greater degree of 
identification of the state with national economic goals in France, and that the 
French state has in the past more actively intervened to assist economic growth. 
However, it is illegitimate draw from this the theme that the French state is 
strong and the British weak. In the context of the privatisation programme it 
is clear that the British Government has been able to implement this far- 
reaching change in political direction with relative ease; moreover, after 
privatisation important tools have been retained for continuing governmental 
intervention. In view of the nature of the major examples of privatisation in 
Britain, there will be litt le  effective competition in the product market for 
their services, and this will be replaced by regulation, in which the government 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in Britain and France
for corporate control, remains under governmental influence through the use of 
the golden share.
That leads to the view that, under modern conditions, the idea of the liberal, 
non-interventionist state is mythical. Even what would appear as the fullest 
expression of government quitting the economic sphere, the privatisation 
programme, is itself an expression of a public policy preference, and government 
retains important powers of intervention. In other words, governmental 
intervention is endemic in the modern economy, and appeal to market forces for 
legitimation is simply inadequate. Moreover, though the current British 
Government talks of the disciplines of free markets, markets are themselves 
institutional creations: 'the market setting in which entrepreneurs and workers 
operate is a complex of interrelated institutions whose character is
historically determined and whose configuration fundamentally affects the 
incentives the market actors face' [Hall, 1986: 35]. The post-privatisation 
economic environment is a direct creation of government decision-making. 
Indeed, this is even more strongly the case in Britain than in France where 
(partly for constitutional reasons) large monopoly u tilities requiring extended 
regulation have not been disposed of.
The real concern, then, should not be to label governments as interventionist or 
non-interventionist, but to create the constitutional means for the legitimation 
of the inevitable governmental policy interventions [for an earlier statement of 
the same pointy see Shonfield, 1965: Part 4]. In Britain this is remarkable’ by 
its absence; the central forum for such legitimation is Parliament, yet its 
effect has been minimal in shaping proposals for privatisation. The role of the 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in Britain and France
steps have been taken in this direction. The major means for constitutional 
legitimation has been the Conseil Const it utionnel, and the Conseil d'Etat has 
been of importance in shaping such areas as government contracting. The 
answers reached in particular cases by these bodies may or may not have been 
the correct ones, but at least their existence has forced some degree of debate 
to take place at the constitutional level [for suggestions of constitutional 
reforms in Britain with similar aims see Harden and Lewis, 19863.
Generally, discussion of constitutional reform in Britain has centred around the 
idea of an entrenched Bill of Rights. Of course, this is an important issue, but 
the discussion here has wider implications. In particular, certain objections to 
such constitutional reform are shown to be largely groundless. Thus a common 
objection is that entrenched constitutional provisions prevent elected 
governments from an untrammelled achievement of their goals, and, by 
implication, that the sole criterion for legitimacy is the electoral process. 
Setting aside the arbitrariness of the British electoral system, it should be 
noted that the existence of substantial constitutional constraints in France did 
not prevent implementation of the major change of direction represented by the 
privatisation programme. Indeed, had the Government been prepared to use the 
procedure for constitutional amendment, it could have privatised monopoly 
enterprises. What has happened is that the French Government was forced to 
engage in a degree of openness in implementing privatisation, in strong contrast 
to the private dealings in Britain; this was especially so as regards pricing. 
If openness represents a prerequisite of any ~ democratic accountability, the 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in Britain and France
A further criticism of constitutional reform is that it diminishes the role of 
the elected representative in Parliament. However, the influence over 
privatisation legislation by the British legislature is not impressive; this also 
applies to France, save for the opportunity provided for reference to the 
Conseil constitutionnel which, as we have seen, has had profound effects on the 
whole privatisation programme. In fact, then, constitutional reform can increase 
the effective power of parliamentarians through giving the chance of appeal to 
an outside scrutineer.
Finally, Bills of Rights have normally been conceived as protecting a rather 
narrowly-defined group of individual rights; thus they have been seen as
negative restraints on reforming governments with a more collective vision of 
social life  [see eg Keeler and Stone, 1987]. However, the constitutional 
constraints implemented here cannot be fitted into the traditional liberal model 
of individual rights, in particular the requirement that monopolies be publicly 
owned and the prohibition on underpricing public assets. In turn, the latter 
represents an application of a broader principle of equality. In the past it 
may be correct that the concept of equality employed by the Conseil was a
highly formal one based on equality of legal treatment and paying scant regard 
to equality of outcome or of resources [see Bell, 1987]. However, the version 
of equality presented in the privatisation decision seems to represent a 
tentative move towards a more egalitarian concept. Thus the referring
parliamentarians had argued that sale below the real value of enterprises
'méconnaîtrait fondamentalement le principe d'égalité en procurant aux 
acquéreurs de ces entreprises un advantage injustifié au détriment de l'ensemble 
des citoyens', and the Conseil accepted that the prohibition of sale below value 




























































































Privatisation of Public Enterprises in Britain and France
constitutional protection for the right of property applied not only to private 
property but to property held by the state and other public authorities [see 
AJDA 1986, 5793. This illustrates the possibility of constitutional protections 
being developed around co lle c tiv e  goals, as well as the protection of individual 
rights, the latter being itself, of course, also of crucial importance.
The detailed working out of these ideas would take us far outside the scope of 
this working paper. Nevertheless, the central theme is clear; Britain does not 
lack a strong state; what it lacks is • the set of ideas and institutions 
associated with the requirement of legitimate policy-making where the concept 
of the state is recognised as central to politics. As a result, government is 
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